Beyond the ontological turn: affirming the relative autonomy of politics by Khan, Gulshan Ara
Khan, Gulshan Ara (2017) Beyond the ontological turn: 
affirming the relative autonomy of politics. Political 
Studies Review, 15 (4). pp. 551-563. ISSN 1478-9302 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/42196/1/GAK%20%28PS%29%20revised%201%28Eprints
%29.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
	 1	
Dr.	Gulshan	Ara	Khan	
School	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	
University	of	Nottingham	
University	Park		
Nottingham	
NG7	2RD.	
	
Title	of	Paper:	Beyond	the	ontological	turn:	affirming	the	relative	autonomy	of	politics		
Journal:	Political	Studies	Review.	
Date	Accepted:	05/04/2017	
	 	
	 2	
Beyond	the	ontological	turn:	affirming	the	relative	autonomy	of	politics		
	
It	 is	 commonly	 recognised	 that	 ‘poststructuralism’	 has	 had	 wide	 impact	 across	 the	
humanities	and	social	sciences.	1	The	extent	of	this	has	been	disproportionate,	with	disciplines	such	
as	literary	criticism,	media	and	cultural	studies,	being	altered	more	extensively	by	poststructuralism	
than	political	 science	 and	 international	 relations;	 although,	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 these	disciplines	have	
also	been	influenced	to	a	considerable	extent.	2	Overall,	I	welcome	these	developments,	however	in	
this	 paper	 I	 nonetheless	 feel	 bound	 to	 raise	 a	 few	 objections	 about	 the	 general	 direction	 of	
poststructuralism.	 Indeed,	 I	 share	the	observation,	advanced	by	several	commentators	3	that	 those	
working	with	poststructuralism	 tend	 -	 increasingly	 it	 seems	 -	 to	be	preoccupied	with	questions	of	
ontology,	and	in	my	view	this	is	clearly	at	the	expense	of	either	a	refinement	of	political	concepts	or	
a	concrete	analysis	of	forms	of	power	and	domination.	I	stress	that	these	are	tendencies,	and	they	
are	 found	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 degree	 in	 different	 authors.	 There	 are	 of	 course	 those	 who	 cut	
against	 the	 grain,	 and	 there	 have	 been	 valuable	 poststructuralist	 analyses	 of	 the	machinations	 of	
power.	Michel	Foucault’s	work	is	an	obvious	case	in	point.	Nevertheless,	a	concern	with	ontological	
questions	 is	 clearly	 a	 feature	 of	 much	 contemporary	 work	 within	 the	 various	 traditions	 of	
poststructuralism.4	I	think	we	need	to	counter	this	tendency,	to	open	critical	distance	from	questions	
of	 ontology,	 and	 to	 turn	 poststructuralism	 instead	 to	 a	 more	 concrete	 engagement	 with	 ‘the	
political’.5	
In	 the	 first	 section	 I	 distinguish	 between	 a	 narrow	 (post-Saussurean)	 and	 a	 broader	
definition	of	‘poststructuralism’,	and	I	consider	the	impact	of	poststructuralism	on	the	disciplines	of	
politics,	 international	 relations,	 and	 especially	 political	 theory.	 I	 stress	 the	 broader	 definition	 of	
poststructuralism,	 because	 the	 preoccupation	 with	 ontology	 is	 found	 across	 these	 wider	
contributions.	 This	 is,	 it	 seems,	 an	 occupational	 hazard	 for	 those	 currently	 working	 with	
poststructuralism.	This	predilection	is	elaborated	more	fully	in	the	following	section,	and	there	I	also	
differentiate	my	 position	 from	 others	 who	 stress	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 poststructuralist	 accounts	 of	
politics	 and	 of	 ‘the	 political’.	 I	 provide	 some	 explanation	 for	 the	 current	 turn	 to	 ontology,	 which	
stems	from	the	circumstances	of	ontological	pluralism,	and	I	consider	some	of	the	consequences	of	
this	 development.	 We	 see	 that	 this	 leads	 many	 poststructuralists	 to	 fetishize	 seemingly	 obscure	
categories,	and	where	there	is	an	explicit	analysis	of	power	and	politics;	these	tend	to	be	read	off	in	
a	direct	fashion	from	the	underlying	ontological	classifications.	
Having	registered	these	criticisms,	in	the	final	section	I	advance	a	few	specific	claims	about	
the	relationship	between	ontology	and	politics.	First,	 I	argue	that	the	only	sincere	response	to	the	
circumstances	 of	 ontological	 pluralism	 is	 to	 affirm	 the	 inherent	 contestability	 of	 each	 ontological	
perspective.	 Then	 I	 develop	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 ‘relative	 autonomy’	 of	 politics	 from	 ontology,	 where	
ontology	cannot	be	said	to	determine	politics	 in	any	direct	or	straightforward	fashion.	We	need	to	
stress	 this	 relative	 autonomy,	 to	 open	 space	 where	 we	 can	 turn	 our	 attention	 towards	 a	 more	
concrete	analysis	and	critique	of	forms	of	power	and	domination.		
	
Poststructuralism:	narrowly	and	more	broadly	defined																																																									
1	For	a	wide-ranging	discussion	of	the	impact	of	poststructuralism,	see	Dews,	1987.	
2	Many	 are	 critical	 of	 these	 developments	 (for	 example,	 Searle,	 1983;	 Geras,	 1988;	 Keohane,	 1989);	 others	
understand	 the	 important	 contribution	 of	 poststructuralism	 across	 the	 humanities	 and	 social	 sciences	 (for	
example,	Connolly,	1974;	Dews,	1987;	Howarth,	2013).		
3	For	example:	Critchley,	2007;	Strathusen,	2009;	Kioupkiolis,	2011;	Bosteels,	2011.	
4	In	 fact,	 the	 turn	 to	 ontology	 represents	 a	 more	 general	 trend	 in	 the	 contemporary	 social	 sciences.	 For	
example	 the	 same	 tendency	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 work	 of	 those	 ‘critical	 realists’	 inspired	 by	 the	 work	 of	 Roy	
Bhaskar;	e.g.	Hay	(2002)	and	Furlong	and	Marsh	(2010).	
5	I	 stress	 that	by	 ‘the	political’	 I	 do	not	 share	Chantal	Mouffe’s	emphasis	on	 the	danger	of	 intense	 forms	of	
conflict	and	‘antagonism’	(Mouffe,	1993).	Instead,	we	should	associate	‘the	political’	with	a	focus	on	forms	of	
power	and	domination,	resistance	and	freedom.	
	 3	
	
The	term	‘poststructuralism’	refers	to	movements	in	continental	philosophy	that	emerged	in	
the	mid-1960s	as	a	 reaction	against	 structuralism.	 From	 its	 inception,	poststructuralism	was	not	a	
homogeneous	body	of	thought,	and	many	of	those	associated	with	poststructuralism	are	unlikely	to	
invoke	 the	 term	 to	describe	 their	work	 (Angermuller,	 2015).	 Indeed,	 the	 key	 French	 thinkers	who	
developed	this	movement	-	such	as	Roland	Barthes,	Jacques	Derrida,	and	Foucault	–	did	not	describe	
themselves	 as	 ‘poststructuralists’,	 and	 -	 as	 XXX	 explains	 in	 his	 contribution	 -	 the	 term	 is	 largely	 a	
retrospective	 formulation	 by	 American	 academics	 to	 describe	 the	 contribution	 of	 these	 leading	
French	theorists.	Nevertheless,	 the	term	clearly	has	traction,	and	because	 it	captures	the	common	
objectives	of	this	generation	of	thinkers	who	sought	to	break	with	the	structuralist	paradigm.	In	the	
early	 1960s	 structuralism	 was	 the	 predominant	 intellectual	 tradition	 in	 France,	 represented	 in	
anthropology	by	Claude	Levi-Strauss,	 in	psychoanalysis	by	 Jacques	Lacan,	and	 in	Marxism	by	Louis	
Althusser,	 all	 of	whom	 tended	 to	explain	 social	 phenomena	with	 reference	 to	 grounded,	 fixed,	 or	
underlying	 structures	 (Dosse,	 1998a;	 1998b).	 Despite	 their	 different	 points	 of	 emphasis,	 the	
poststructuralists	 worked	 through	 the	 assumptions	 of	 structuralism	 in	 various	ways	 and	 to	 break	
with	its	ahistorical,	apolitical,	universalist	and	positivist	propensities.	There	is	not	the	scope	here	to	
discuss	the	contributions	of	each	of	these	thinkers	in	detail.	Instead,	I	distinguish	between	a	narrow	
definition	 of	 poststructuralism,	 referring	 to	 those	 who	 engaged	 primarily	 and	 explicitly	 with	
Saussure’s	 theory	 of	 structural	 linguistics,	 and	 a	 broader	 definition	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 wider	
movements	associated	with	 ‘poststructuralism’	and	who	share	many	core	 theoretical	assumptions	
which	I	describe	below.	
Key	 to	 an	 appreciation	 of	 structuralism	 is	 the	 detail	 of	 Saussure’s	 theory	 of	 structural	
linguistics.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 Saussure’s	 approach	 was	 his	 insight	 that	 the	 ‘the	 basic	 unit	 of	 any	
language	[is]	the	linguistic	sign’,	and	that	the	sign	is	composed	of	a	sound	or	acoustic	element	(the	
signifier)	and	the	mental	 image/concept	or	 idea	(the	signified)	(Saussure,	1974,	67;	Sturrock,	1979,	
6).	 Saussure	 also	 stressed	 that	 there	 is	 no	 necessary	 relationship	 between	 a	 given	 idea	 and	 the	
sounds	 with	 which	 it	 is	 represented	 (Saussure,	 1974,	 67-8).	 This	 leads	 to	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	
‘arbitrary’	relation	between	the	signifier	and	signified,	and	in	turn	to	the	realisation	that	we	can	only	
ever	 understand	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 signifier	 through	 its	 relations	 to	 other	 signifiers	 within	 a	
structured	‘totality’	(langue)	(Saussure,	1974,	67).	The	signifier,	in	other	words,	is	like	a	pawn	in	the	
game	of	 chess:	 it	 is	 not	defined	by	 its	 ‘positive	 content’	 -	 as	 a	pawn	 ‘in	 and	of	 itself’	 -	 but	 rather	
negatively;	that	is,	in	its	relations	to	the	other	chess	pieces	(Saussure,	1974,	117).	The	pawn	is	pawn	
because	it	is	not	the	queen,	a	bishop,	the	king	or	a	rook.	This	is	what	Saussure	meant	when	he	said	
that	‘in	language	there	are	only	differences…without	positive	terms’	(Saussure,	1974,	120).	
It	follows	from	Saussure’s	approach	that	the	meaning/value	of	a	signifier	is	dependent	upon	
the	system	or	context	in	which	it	 is	 invoked.	However,	Saussure	also	presented	the	context,	or	the	
underlying	linguistic	structure,	as	static.	His	emphasis	was	on	‘synchronic	structure’,	i.e.	on	analysing	
the	 relations	 between	 signs	 at	 a	 fixed	 point	 in	 time,	 rather	 than	 a	 ‘diachronic	 approach’,	 which	
would	trace	the	morphology	 in	the	meaning	of	signs	as	they	change	historically.	We	can	therefore	
associate	 ‘poststructuralism’,	 in	 a	 narrow	 sense,	 with	 those	 who	 explicitly	 reworked	 Saussure’s	
theory	 to	 challenge	 his	 claim	 that	 the	 play	 of	 signification	 is	 fixed	 within	 a	 particular	 temporal	
moment.	 This	 was	 primarily	 developed	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Lacan	 and	 Derrida	 (Lacan,	 1998,	 161-197;	
Derrida,	1978,	351-370;	1982,	307-330).	Lacan	emphasised	what	he	called	the	permanent	sliding	of	
the	signified	under	the	signifier.	In	other	words,	he	highlighted	how	meaning	is	never	fully	fixed	but	
rather	tends	to	veer	off	or	to	be	repeatedly	displaced,	until	some	anchoring	point	manages	to	halt	
this	sliding	and	temporarily	stabilise	meaning.	Lacan	used	the	example	of	the	signifier	‘table’	to	draw	
attention	to	this	ambiguous	play	of	meaning,	because	a	‘table’	(as	a	noun)	can	refer	to	both	an	item	
of	furniture	or	to	a	set	of	figures	displayed	in	columns,	and	(as	a	verb)	‘table’	can	also	refer	to	the	act	
of	 putting	 forward	 a	 set	 of	 suggestions	 in	 a	 meeting	 (Lacan,	 1998,	 32).	 Similarly,	 Derrida	 coined	
several	innovative	terms	to	describe	this	repeated	disruption	of	established	points	of	meaning.	The	
most	notorious	of	which	is	the	idea	of	différance.	Différance	draws	attention	not	only	to	the	spatial	
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differences	and	relations	between	signifiers	(i.e.	the	differences	within	a	given	context),	but	also	to	
the	reiterated	patterns	of	deferral	and	disruption,	i.e.	the	play	of	meaning	that	repeatedly	disrupts	
Saussure’s	idea	of	synchronic	closure	(Derrida,	1982).	
If	 we	 take	 this	 as	 ‘poststructuralism’	 in	 the	 narrow	 sense,	 we	 see	 that	 one	 of	 the	 core	
objectives	 was	 to	 emphasise	 the	 inherent	 ambiguity	 of	 language	 and	 representation	 to	 disrupt	
claims	to	fixity	and	closure.	The	influence	of	poststructuralism	in	this	limited	sense	was	arguably	at	
its	peak	in	the	1980s,	when	Derridean	‘deconstruction’	was	dominant	in	American	literary	criticism.	
However,	 if	 we	 turn	 now	 to	 the	wider	 impact	 of	 poststructuralism,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 reports	 of	 the	
death	 of	 poststructuralism	 in	 the	 late	 1980s,	 for	 example	 by	 Anthony	 Glidden’s,	 were	misguided	
(Giddens,	 1987,	 195).	 In	 fact,	 to	 the	 contrary,	 no	 sooner	 had	 poststructuralism	 mobilised	 these	
criticisms	of	fixed	(linguistic)	structure,	then	these	ideas	began	to	be	fused	and	imported	into	other	
traditions	and	perspectives	such	as	Marxism,	colonial	studies,	phenomenology,	psychoanalysis,	and	
feminism.	 In	so	doing,	the	 impact	of	poststructuralism	gave	birth	to	new	approaches	such	as	post-
colonialism,	post-Marxism,	and	post-Anarchism.	Indeed,	this	has	been	the	distinguishing	feature	of	
the	impact	of	poststructuralism,	i.e.	the	diffusion	of	its	core	ideas	into	a	series	of	related	disciplines	
and	approaches.	To	some	considerable	extent,	 this	has	 included	 the	disciplines	of	political	 science	
and	international	relations.	For	example,	this	can	be	seen	in	the	work	of	those	who	have	mobilised	
Foucault’s	notions	of	governmentality	and	bio-politics	to	bring	critical	 insights	to	discussions	about	
state	 sovereignty	 in	 international	 relations	 (Campbell,	 1992).	 Commentators	 have	 also	 drawn	
attention	 to	 the	 homology	 between	 poststructuralism	 and	 the	 ‘new	 institutionalist’	 approach	 in	
political	 science,	 with	 its	 similar	 emphasis	 on	 the	 open-ended	 and	 transient	 quality	 of	 informal	
political	institutions	(Torfing,	2012).	Nevertheless,	we	also	noted	at	the	outset	that	these	disciplines	
have	 shown	greater	 resistance	 to	poststructuralism	 than	other	 areas	 in	 the	humanities	 and	 social	
sciences.	 Indeed,	poststructuralism	has	not	penetrated	 the	 core	of	 these	disciplines	which	 remain	
governed	by	various	forms	of	neo-positivism;	i.e.	by	rational	choice	theory	and	post-behavioralism	in	
political	 science,	 and	 by	 the	 debates	 between	 neo-realism,	 liberalism,	 and	 constructivism	 in	
international	relations.		
However,	one	area	where	the	impact	of	poststructuralism	has	been	prevalent	over	the	past	
few	 decades	 is	 in	 Anglo-American	 political	 theory.	 The	 influence	 of	 poststructuralism	 has	 been	
especially	evident	in	the	contributions	of	several	leading	political	theorists,	variously	associated	with	
‘agonistic’	and	‘radical	democracy’.	For	example,	in	Political	Theory	and	The	Displacement	of	Politics,	
Bonnie	 Honig	 drew	 upon	 Derrida	 and	 others	 to	 show	 how	 the	 predominant	 liberal	 and	
communitarian	approaches	attempt	to	reduce	politics	-	which	she	described	in	terms	of	permanent	
contestation	-	to	either	philosophical	principles	of	justice	or	to	a	shared	background	of	moral	norms	
(Honig,	 1993,	 131).	 In	The	Return	 of	 the	 Political,	Mouffe	 drew	upon	 the	Derridean	 notion	 of	 the	
‘constitutive	outside’	to	problematize	the	same	tendency	towards	closure	in	liberalism	as	well	as	in	
deliberative	theories	of	democracy.	These	approaches	too	readily	assume	the	possibility	of	rational	
consensus,	and,	on	Mouffe’s	view,	they	consequently	misunderstand	the	inherent	antagonism	at	the	
heart	 of	 ‘the	 political’	 (Mouffe,	 1993,	 2).	 In	 The	 Ethos	 of	 Pluralisation,	William	 Connolly	 similarly	
drew	on	poststructuralism	to	criticise	the	predominant	conception	of	pluralism	in	American	political	
science.	His	 stress	was	 on	 the	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 ‘pluralisation’,	 and	 how	 this	 repeatedly	 disrupts	
established	configurations	of	 identity	and	difference	 (Connolly,	1995,	 xiv).	 These	contributions	are	
good	 examples	 of	 how	 poststructuralist	 insights	 can	 be	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 explicitly	 political	
questions,	 and	 perhaps	 especially	 as	 a	 key	 resource	 for	 the	 refinement	 and	 critique	 of	 political	
concepts.	 Indeed,	 Connolly’s	The	Terms	of	 Political	Discourse	–	which	was	 first	 published	 in	 1974,	
and	 which	 subsequently	 passed	 through	 several	 editions,	 increasingly	 showing	 the	 influence	 of	
poststructuralism	–	provides	an	exemplary	case	of	how	key	concepts	used	in	political	science,	such	
as	power,	interest,	and	freedom,	can	be	reworked	in	light	of	poststructuralism	(Connolly,	1974).	This	
focus	 on	 enhancing	 political	 concepts	 has	 also	 been	 evident	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Ernesto	 Laclau	 who	
likewise	 mobilised	 poststructuralism	 to	 rework	 concepts	 such	 as	 hegemony,	 representation,	
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populism,	 and	emancipation.6	In	 each	 case,	 Laclau	wrestled	 these	 concepts	 away	 from	 their	more	
established	meanings,	either	in	conventional	Marxist	theories	or	in	mainstream	political	science,	 in	
order	to	give	them	a	wider	and	more	productive	set	of	connotations.		
In	one	form	or	another,	each	of	these	theorists	endorses	the	poststructuralist	emphasis	on	
temporal	dislocation	over	fixed	structure.	However,	they	do	not	all	proceed	via	an	explicit	critique	of	
the	 structuralist	 theory	 of	 the	 sign,	 and	 so	 they	 have	 varying	 degrees	 of	 proximity	 to	
poststructuralism	narrowly	defined.	It	is	therefore	necessary	at	this	point	to	broaden	the	definition	
of	 ‘poststructuralism’	to	account	more	fully	for	these	and	other	comparable	contributions.	 Indeed,	
we	ought	to	include	in	a	wider	account	of	‘poststructuralism’	a	number	of	fellow	travellers	who	do	
not	 take	 their	 principal	 inspiration	 from	 a	 reworking	 of	 Saussure,	 but	whom	 nonetheless	 share	 a	
common	theoretical	orientation.	This	would	include	other	prominent	French	theorists	such	as	Jean-
François	Lyotard	and	Gilles	Deleuze,	but	also	Richard	Rorty,	who	shared	a	considerable	amount	with	
this	collection	of	French	theorists	but	who	took	his	inspiration	from	American	pragmatism	(Deleuze,	
1983,	Lyotard,	1984;	Rorty,	1989).	Despite	significant	differences,	these	contributors	shared	a	broad	
set	 of	 theoretical	 assumptions,	 which	 can	 be	 described	 as	 follows.	 Each	 of	 these	 thinkers	 draws	
attention	 to	 the	 contingent	 nature	 of	 identity,	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 relationality,	 they	 tend	 to	
emphasise	 temporal	 dislocation	 over	 fixed	 structure,	 and	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 the	 anti-
dialectical	or	open-ended	character	of	this	temporal	dislocation.	Moreover,	these	theories	tend	also	
to	 embrace	 epistemological	 perspectivism,	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 ungrounded	 nature	 of	 truth	
claims,	 and	 more	 generally	 they	 mistrust	 appeals	 to	 ‘reason’,	 which	 need	 to	 be	 repeatedly	
unmasked	as	ruses	 for	the	exercise	of	power.	 It	 is	 for	these	reasons	that	poststructuralist	 theories	
are	commonly	referred	to	as	anti-essentialist	and	anti-foundationalist,	and	in	the	remainder	of	this	
paper	I	use	the	term	‘poststructuralism’	to	refer	to	this	wider	series	of	movements.	Indeed,	we	can	
concur	 with	 David	 Howarth	 when	 he	 says	 that	 poststructuralism,	 in	 this	 broader	 sense,	 is	
characterised	by	a	 ‘particular	 style	of	 theorising’	or	by	 something	 like	a	 common	ethos	 (Howarth,	
2013,	6).	However,	those	who	work	within	these	traditions	are	also	increasingly	prone	to	prioritise	
discussions	of	ontology	over	an	analysis	of	power	and	domination,	and	it	is	to	this	that	we	now	turn.		
	
A	displacement	of	‘the	political’	through	a	preoccupation	with	ontology	
	
As	I	have	said,	I	am	not	alone	in	my	observation	that	contemporary	poststructuralist	theory	
often	appears	preoccupied	with	questions	of	ontology.	 In	this	section	 I	outline	some	of	the	causes	
and	 consequences	 of	 this	 phenomenon.	 First	 however,	we	 should	 note	 how	 this	 assessment	 also	
resonates	with	a	more	wide-ranging	set	of	reflections	that	emphasise,	in	one	form	or	another,	that	
poststructuralism	is	in	some	sense	insufficiently	political.	Indeed,	these	kinds	of	criticisms	have	been	
commonly	 expressed,	 and	 sometimes	 by	 those	who	 are	 broadly	 associated	with	 these	 traditions.	
Derridean	 ‘deconstruction’	 for	example	has	been	especially	 subject	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 criticism.	Slavoj	
Žižek	has	criticised	deconstruction	for	 leading	to	a	political	 impasse	and	Connolly	has	also	stressed	
that	 deconstruction	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 producing	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘perpetual	 postponism’	 in	 politics	 (Žižek,	
1999;	 Connolly,	 1995).	 Similarly,	 Diana	 Coole	 has	 described	 the	 tendency	 of	 poststructuralists	 to	
circumvent	 political	 questions,	 and	 this	 is	 again	 despite	 her	 overall	 commitment	 to	 continental	
traditions	 of	 thought.	 She	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 prominent	 Routledge	 series	 of	 books	 on	
‘Poststructuralism	and	the	Political’	-	which	includes	titles	on	‘Derrida	and	the	Political’,	‘Deleuze	and	
the	Political’,	 ‘Foucault	and	the	Political’	and	so	on	–	and	points	out	how,	in	her	view,	these	books	
display	a	 lot	of	sophisticated	theory	but	 tend	also	to	show	a	marked	absence	of	engagement	with	
explicitly	political	questions	(Coole,	2000).	More	recently,	Lois	McNay	has	criticized	those	associated	
with	 ‘agonistic	democracy’,	 such	as	Connolly	and	Mouffe,	 for	what	she	describes	as	 the	social	and	
political	 ‘weightlessness’	of	their	analyses,	because	in	her	view	these	theories	are	too	abstract	and	
don’t	engage	with	questions	of	structural	inequality	(McNay,	2014,	14).																																																									
6	For	example:	Laclau	and	Mouffe	1985,	Laclau,	1996.	
	 6	
	 I	agree	with	the	underlying	sentiments	behind	these	interventions,	although	I	take	odds	with	
some	of	 the	 specific	points	of	emphasis.	For	example,	 I	 think	McKay	makes	valuable	observations;	
however	she	mistakenly	associates	this	tendency	with	a	collection	of	thinkers	who	are,	arguably,	the	
least	blameworthy	of	this	general	trend.	Indeed,	it	is	important	to	stress	that	there	have	been	good	
examples	of	poststructuralist	analyses	of	the	operations	of	power	and	domination.	Foucault’s	work	
is	surely	exemplary,	and	perhaps	so	too	is	the	work	of	Judith	Butler.	Nevertheless,	those	who	McNay	
flags	 up	 for	 criticism	 -	 such	 as	 Connolly,	 Laclau,	 and	 Mouffe	 -	 have	 also	 contributed	 to	 our	
understanding	 of	 power	 and	 the	 political,	 and	 especially,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 above,	 through	 their	
refinement	of	political	concepts.	For	example,	Laclau’s	reworking	of	the	notion	of	populism	provides	
crucial	 insights	 into	 the	 current	 context	 of	 ‘post-truth	 politics’,	 the	 UK	 vote	 for	 Brexit,	 and	 the	
Presidency	of	Donald	Trump	(Laclau,	2006).7	Indeed,	the	achievements	of	this	earlier	generation	of	
thinkers	ought	not	to	be	underestimated,	and	so	 I	think	we	need	a	more	precise	understanding	of	
the	reasons	for	this	growing	tendency	to	displace	‘the	political’	with	questions	of	ontology.	For	this,	I	
suggest	 we	 look	 more	 closely	 at	 the	 circumstances	 of	 ontological	 pluralism,	 which	 increasingly	
delimit	work	in	the	social	and	political	sciences.		
As	 well	 as	 the	 diffusion	 of	 poststructuralism	 into	 a	 range	 of	 related	 disciplines,	 another	
defining	 feature	 has	 been	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 poststructuralist	 paradigm	 itself,	 as	well	 as	 a	
proliferation	 of	 a	 range	 of	 related	 perspectives	 and	 ideas	 emerging	 often	 in	 debate	 with	 the	
proponents	 of	 poststructuralism	 in	 the	 narrow	 sense.	 So,	 for	 example,	 in	 addition	 to	 recurrent	
exchanges	 between	 poststructuralists	 and	 proponents	 of	 psychoanalysis,	 more	 recent	 years	 have	
seen	the	emergence	of	approaches	such	as	actor	network	theory,	speculative	realism,	and	the	new	
materialism.8	Indeed,	what	we	find	in	contemporary	continental	philosophy	is	a	constant	pluralising	
of	distinct	approaches	and	different	positions.	 If	each	of	 these	perspectives	can	be	brought	under	
the	heading	of	‘poststructuralism’	in	a	broad	sense,	then	poststructuralism	is	clearly	thriving	in	the	
form	of	 a	 set	of	 interlocking	 viewpoints	 and	debates.	 There	 is	not	 the	 scope	 in	 this	paper	 to	 fully	
account	for	these	different	positions,	nor	is	my	objective	here	to	choose	between	them.	The	point	is	
simply	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 this	 recent	 proliferation	 of	 perspectives,	 and	 to	 emphasise	 the	 link	
between	 this	 development	 and	 the	 tendency	 to	 prioritise	 questions	 of	 ontology.	 Indeed,	 despite	
their	 many	 points	 of	 commonality,	 it	 is	 ultimately	 the	 differences	 that	 define	 these	 respective	
approaches,	 and	 the	 proponents	 have	 stressed	 the	 uniqueness	 and	 priority	 of	 their	 respective	
positions.		Moreover,	when	they	do	so,	they	typically	present	these	differences	in	ontological	terms.		
A	number	of	prominent	examples	will	have	 to	 suffice	here	 to	 illustrate	 this	 general	 trend.	
The	debate	(which	is	mainly)	between	those	who	follow	Deleuze	and	proponents	of	psychoanalysis	
has	been	presented	as	an	alternative	between	theories	of	 ‘abundance’	and	‘lack’.9	This	 is,	for	sure,	
an	important	topic,	which	is	 in	large	part	about	the	status	of	desire,	and	whether	desire	should	be	
understood	as	a	productive	 force	of	 life	or	 is	 instead	generated	by	prohibition.	The	point	 is	not	to	
underestimate	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 respective	 claims,	 but	 simply	 to	 note	 how	 this	 debate	
operates	at	the	level	of	competing	ontological	positions.	The	same	is	true	for	more	recent	debates	
that	have	followed	from	the	intervention	of	the	‘new	materialism’,	which	is	further	discussed	by	XXX	
in	 his	 contribution	 to	 this	 symposium.	 Central	 to	 these	 approaches	 has	 been	 a	 critique	 of	
anthropocentricism,	and	an	attempt	 to	undermine	the	distinction	between	human	and	nonhuman																																																									
7	McNay’s	point	about	social	weightlessness	is	nonetheless	insightful,	and	ought	to	be	applied	more	generally	
to	 contemporary	 political	 theory.	 Indeed,	 her	 observations	 serve	 as	 a	 constant	 reminder	 to	 avoid	 the	
enticement	 towards	 abstraction	 that	 adheres	 in	 all	 modes	 of	 political	 theorising.	 We	 might	 note	 how	 her	
criticisms	 are	 not	 too	 dissimilar	 from	 those	 levied	 against	 contemporary	 analytical	 approaches.	 Those	 who	
work	 with	 Rawlsian	 ‘ideal	 theory’	 have	 long	 been	 criticized	 for	 reducing	 politics	 to	 abstract	 theories	 of	
morality,	law,	or	applied	ethics,	but	this	line	of	critique	has	recently	received	renewed	impetus	following	the	
call	by	self-styled	‘realist’	theorists	to	bring	normative	political	theory	back	to	a	focus	on	the	situated	context	
of	claims	to	justice	and	right	(For	example:	Rossi	and	Sleat,	2014).	
8	For	example:	Latour,	1993;	Meillassoux,	2008;	Bennett,	2010.	
9	See	the	essays	collected	in	Thomassen	and	Tonder,	2005.	
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forms	of	agency	 (Bennett,	2010).	Again,	 the	critical	 responses	 to	 these	arguments	have	 tended	 to	
focus	 on	 claims	 about	 the	 fundamental	 characteristics	 of	 human	 beings,	 for	 example	 in	 their	
capacities	for	action	and	judgement	(Zerilli,	2015).	As	I	have	said,	my	objective	here	is	not	to	choose	
between	 these	 positions,	 but	 simply	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 ontological	 register	 in	 which	 these	
claims	 have	 been	 articulated.	 In	 some	 senses	 this	 is	 ironic,	 given	 that	 poststructuralism	 is	 widely	
perceived	to	eschew	foundations,	and	yet	what	we	find	is	seemingly	endless	debates	about	different	
forms	 of	 post-foundations;	 here	 there	 are	 no	 essences,	 but,	 it	 seems,	 many	 competing	 -	 often	
passionately	competing	-	forms	of	anti-essentialism.	The	message	that	emerges	from	these	debates	
is	clearly	that	ontology	matters,	and	informs	a	particular	vision	of	politics.	However,	the	danger	is,	I	
think,	 that	 questions	 of	 ontology	 tend	 to	 displace	 a	 more	 direct	 focus	 on	 explicitly	 political	
questions.	Often,	these	debates	take	the	form	of	a	respective	fine-tuning	of	ontological	viewpoints.	
At	this	level	of	abstraction,	there	is	a	lot	of	respective	talking	past	each	other,	but	little	in	the	way	of	
a	direct	analysis	of	forms	of	power	and	control	or	a	refinement	of	political	concepts.	
Indeed,	another	difficulty	that	emerges	from	these	recent	trends	is	the	tendency	towards	a	
proliferation	 of	 competing	 sets	 of	 complex	 and	 seemingly	 obscure	 ontological	 concepts	 and	
categories.	 Of	 course,	 poststructuralists	 have	 for	 a	 long	 time	 been	 criticised	 by	 analytical	
philosophers	 for	 their	 apparent	 obscurantism,10	and	 I	 stress	 that	 my	 claim	 here	 is	 not	 that	
poststructuralists	are	deliberate	obscure.	Rather,	I	think	the	problem	follows	more	directly	from	this	
standoff	 between	 competing	 ontologies.	 As	 each	 side	 seeks	 to	 refine	 their	 respective	 ontological	
perspectives,	they	do	so	through	the	initiation	of	novel	concepts	and	terms.	For	the	most	part,	these	
terms	 do	 have	 specific	 meaning	 within	 the	 respective	 theoretical	 frameworks,	 but,	 to	 the	
uninitiated,	 these	 frameworks	 must	 increasingly	 appear	 to	 resemble	 an	 abyss	 of	 murky	 and	
incomprehensible	 vocabularies.	 Finally,	 when	 poststructuralists	 do	 engage	 more	 directly	 with	
questions	of	politics,	 there	 is	a	 tendency	 to	 read	 their	 favoured	 forms	of	politics	directly	 from	the	
ontological	 categories,	 i.e.	 to	 reduce	 politics	 to	 these	 underlying	 ontological	 viewpoints.	 Again,	 a	
couple	of	pertinent	examples	will	have	to	suffice	to	illustrate	this	more	general	trend.	This	can,	for	
example,	 be	 seen	 on	 each	 side	 of	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘abundance’	 and	 ‘lack’	 -	 for	 instance	 when	
Michael	Hardt	and	Antonio	Negri	move	directly	from	a	Deleuzean	ontology	of	desire	to	a	conception	
of	 political	 subjectivity	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 immanent	 movement	 of	 ‘the	 multitude’,	 and	 when	 Žižek	
similarly	 sees	 a	 direct	 connection	 between	 the	 Lacanian	 account	 of	 constitutive	 ‘lack’	 and	 his	
defence	of	 a	 Leninist	 politics	of	 revolutionary	 rupture	or	what	he	 calls	 ‘the	Act’	 (Hardt	and	Negri,	
2001;	Žižek,	2002).	This	tendency	-	to	treat	ontology	and	politics	as	somehow	synonymous	-	needs,	I	
think,	 to	 be	 resisted,	 and	 so	 in	 the	 final	 section	 I	 advance	 some	more	 general	 reflections	 on	 the	
relationship	 between	 ontology	 and	 politics,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 establishing	 the	 relative	 autonomy	 of	
politics	from	ontological	concerns.			
	
The	relative	autonomy	of	politics	from	ontology	
	
Having	 outlined	 these	 various	 criticisms,	 in	 this	 section	 I	 consider	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘weak	
ontology’	 that	 has	 been	 invoked	 to	 describe	 the	 forms	 of	 ontological	 argument	 associated	 with	
poststructuralism,	and	I	defend	the	idea	of	ontological	pluralism,	which	not	only	draws	attention	to	
the	 multiplicity	 of	 different	 worldviews,	 but	 insists	 also	 that	 no	 specific	 viewpoint	 can	 claim	
metaphysical	certainty	or	priority.	Moreover,	I	make	the	case	that	the	circumstances	of	ontological	
pluralism	suggest	a	relative	autonomy	of	politics	from	ontology.	This	emphasis	 is	designed	to	open	
space	between	ontology	and	politics,	 to	 re-direct	our	efforts	 towards	 a	more	 concrete	analysis	of	
political	concerns.	Indeed,	the	future	success	of	poststructuralism	will	depend	I	think	on	the	capacity	
of	theorists	working	with	distinct	ontological	viewpoints	partly	to	look	across	these	differences,	and	
to	prioritise	instead	the	need	to	sharpen	our	conceptual	tools	for	understanding	politics,	power,	and	
domination.																																																									
10	For	example:	Searle	1983.	
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To	 appreciate	 the	 approaches	 to	 ontology	 characteristic	 of	 the	 various	 traditions	 of	
poststructuralism,	 we	 need	 briefly	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 influence	 of	 Martin	 Heidegger.	 Indeed,	
Heidegger	 was	 a	 significant	 inspiration	 for	 the	 development	 of	 poststructuralism,	 and	 more	
generally	 his	work	 has	 been	 central	 to	 the	way	 in	which	we	 think	 about	 ontology	 today.	 For	 the	
ancient	Greeks,	ontology	was	a	branch	of	metaphysics	concerned	with	the	nature	of	‘Being’	or	with	
‘what	 is’?	 However,	 Heidegger	 highlighted	 how	 conventional	 approaches	 to	 ontology	 –	 especially	
since	Plato	and	Aristotle	-	have	tended	to	take	a	foundationalist	approach.	Here,	ontology	is	more	or	
less	associated	with	a	categorizing	of	the	basic	kinds	of	phenomena	that	are	said	to	exist	beyond	the	
realm	of	 appearances.	On	Heidegger’s	 account,	 this	 conventional	metaphysical	 orientation,	which	
runs	 through	 the	 western	 tradition,	 is	 too	 simple	 and	 straightforward.	 As	 he	 sees	 it,	 these	
approaches	have	forgotten	the	most	elementary	question	of	ontology,	which	is	about	the	‘meaning	
of	Being’	as	such.	Therefore,	what	ought	to	be	a	most	difficult	and	demanding	question,	has	instead	
‘taken	on	a	clarity	and	self-evidence	such	that	if	anyone	continues	to	ask	about	it	he	is	charged	with	
an	 error	 of	 method’	 (Heidegger,	 1998,	 21).	 Traditional	 metaphysical	 approaches	 also	 typically	
present	 ontological	 questions	 in	 cognitive	 and	 rational	 terms,	 i.e.	 as	 a	 matter	 ultimately	 to	 be	
resolved	regarding	epistemological	questions	about	what	can	and	cannot	be	known	to	be	true,	and	
again	this	tendency	runs	through	the	tradition,	and	 is	 just	as	evident	 in	Plato	as	 it	 is	 in	Hobbes,	as	
well	as	in	contemporary	analytical	philosophy.11	
	 As	well	 as	 these	 critical	 observations,	Heidegger	 also	put	 forward	an	 alternative	 approach	
that	 he	 called	 ‘fundamental	 ontology’.	 By	 way	 of	 contrast,	 Heidegger	 proceeded	 by	 way	 of	 a	
phenomenological	 rather	 than	 a	 cognitive	 approach.	His	 focus	was	 on	 the	 basic	modes	 of	 human	
‘being	 in	 the	world’	 and	his	 analysis	moved	 inexorably	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	question	of	 the	
meaning	 of	 Being	 ultimately	 resists	 every	 attempt	 at	 definition,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 the	 disruptive	
temporality	that	is	constitutive	of	human	experience	(Heidegger,	1998,	53).	Heidegger’s	influence	on	
poststructuralism	 (especially	 on	 Derrida)	 -	 with	 its	 comparable	 stress	 on	 temporal	 dislocation	 -	
should	 be	 evident,	 and	 this	 is	 so	 too	 with	 his	 general	 approach	 to	 ontology.12	Indeed,	 when	
poststructuralists	 engage	 in	 questions	 of	 ontology	 they	 are	 generally	 not	 seeking	 to	 resolve	 the	
ancient	 philosophical	 problem,	 i.e.	 to	 define	 with	 cognitive	 certainty	 the	 ‘essence’	 or	 ‘nature	 of	
being’	 (Strathausen,	2009).	 Instead,	 following	Heidegger,	 they	typically	aim	simultaneously	both	to	
define	 some	 fundamental	 features	 of	 the	 world,	 and	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 these	 fundaments	 are	
contingent,	 and	 so	 they	 cannot	 be	 fully	 grounded.	With	 this	 characteristic	 double	 gesture,	 Oliver	
Marchart	has	argued,	poststructuralists	are	best	understood	as	post-foundationalist	 rather	than	as	
resolutely	anti-foundationalist	or	anti-essentialist	(Marchart,	2007).	Similarly,	Stephen	K.	White	has	
distinguished	between	what	he	 calls	 ‘strong’	and	 ‘weak’	ontology.	The	 former	 -	more	 traditional	 -	
approaches	 ‘claim	 to	 show	 us	 how	 the	world	 [really]	 is’,	 whereas	 poststructuralist	 proponents	 of	
‘weak’	 ontology	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 need	 for	 ontological	 foundations,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	
present	their	assumptions	about	the	‘self’	and	the	‘world’	as	inherently	contestable	(White,	2000,	6).	
	 This	characteristic	double	gesture	has	been	exemplified	in	the	work	of	Connolly.13	Connolly’s	
appreciation	of	post-foundationalism	leads	him	to	stress	the	inherent	contestability	of	every	set	of	
ontological	claims.	This	effectively	politicises	ontology,	because	it	follows	that	no	set	of	ontological	
assumptions	can	claim	metaphysical	certainty,	nor	is	it	possible	to	describe	reality	in	neutral	terms.																																																									
11	For	example:	Plato,	1992;	Hobbes,	1968,	76;	Quine,	1976.	
12	Of	 course,	 Heidegger	 is	 not	 the	 only	 influence	 for	 ‘poststructuralist’	 conceptions	 of	 ontology.	 A	 fuller	
account	would	need	 to	explore	 for	example	also	 the	 importance	of	Deleuze’s	ontology	of	 ‘immanence’	 and	
‘life’.	 This	 has	 been	 a	major	 reference	point	 for	 the	 ‘new	materialist’	 approaches,	 and,	 no	doubt,	 there	 are	
some	crucial	points	of	difference	between	the	new	materialism	and	certain	strands	of	Heideggerian	thought.	
There	 is	 no	 scope	 in	 this	 paper	 to	 address	 these	 differences.	 However,	 they	 do	 get	 coverage	 in	 XXX	
contribution	to	this	symposium.		
13	For	example:	the	chapter	‘Nothing	is	Fundamental’	 in	The	Ethos	of	Pluralisation,	as	well	as	Connolly,	1993,	
377.		
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Indeed,	 we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 that	 we	 currently	 experience	 a	 condition	 of	 ontological	
pluralism,	 and	 we	 can	 now	 add	 that	 none	 of	 the	 contending	 ontological	 viewpoints	 are	
incontestable,	and	so	 they	are	all	 in	 some	sense	politicised.	Moreover,	 I	want	 to	 stress	 that	 these	
circumstances	 –	 of	 the	 politicisation	 of	 ontology	 –	 are	 different	 from	 the	 tendencies	 I	 described	
above,	 i.e.	 the	 tendency	 to	 displace	 more	 straightforwardly	 political	 concerns	 with	 ontological	
questions.	Indeed,	the	politicisation	of	ontology	seems	both	inevitable,	given	the	fact	of	ontological	
pluralism,	and	something	 to	be	welcomed.	However,	 this	 inevitability	does	not	also	 follow	 for	 the	
tendency	 to	 reduce	 politics	 to	 ontology.	 There	 are,	 as	 we	 saw	 above,	 reasons	 for	 this	 increasing	
tendency,	and	these	do,	in	part,	follow	from	the	circumstances	of	ontological	pluralism,	as	each	side	
seeks	to	defend	and	refine	their	ontological	categories.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	not	easy	to	avoid	questions	of	
ontology	altogether.	As	Carsten	Strathusen	says	‘ontologies	literally	live	(i.e.,	they	become	embodied	
and	practiced)	by	the	credo	of	those	who	adhere	to	them,	and	this	credo	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	
rational	 power	 or	 philosophical	 logic’	 (Stathausen,	 2006).	 Nevertheless,	 my	 sense	 is	 that	 the	
tendency	to	reduce	the	study	of	politics	to	categories	of	ontology	is	not	inexorable,	and	it	remains	
possible	to	establish	some	element	of	critical	distance	from	a	given	set	of	ontological	assumptions.	
To	finesse	this	point,	I	advance	the	idea	of	a	‘relative	autonomy’	to	further	highlight	the	relationship	
between	ontology	and	politics.14		
The	 term	 ‘relative	 autonomy’	 is	 borrowed	 from	 Althusser,	 who	 was,	 of	 course,	 working	
within	the	Marxist	framework,	and	who	developed	this	idea	to	explain	the	relationship	between	the	
economic	base	and	the	various	realms	of	the	‘superstructure’,	i.e.	politics,	law,	ideology	and	culture	
(Althusser,	 1971).	 Althusser	 sought	 to	 overcome	what	 he	 understood	 as	 the	 simplistic	 account	 of	
economic	 determinism	 characteristic	 of	 conventional	 Marxism,	 where	 the	 superstructure	 was	
conceived	ultimately	as	a	‘reflection’	of	the	underlying	economic	infrastructure	or	of	the	‘forces	and	
relations	of	production’	(Althusser,	1971).	By	way	of	contrast,	on	his	account,	each	of	the	different	
elements	 of	 the	 superstructure	 needs	 to	 be	 grasped	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 own	 distinct	 purposes	 and	
effects,	and	 these,	 in	 turn,	are	only	ever	 related	 to	 the	 infrastructure,	as	well	as	 to	each	other,	 in	
complex	 forms	 of	 mutual	 imbrication	 or	 ‘over-determination’	 (Althusser,	 1971).	 In	 other	 words,	
whilst	the	economy	necessarily	retained	a	determining	role	in	relation	to	the	various	elements	of	the	
superstructure,	this	was	never	a	simple	or	absolute	form	of	determination,	and	the	latter	retained	a	
degree	of	‘relative	autonomy’	from	the	former.		
Althusser’s	 intervention	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 debate	 and	 critical	 assessment,	 his	
relationship	 to	 structuralism	 and	 poststructuralism	 is	 complex,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 scope	 here	 to	
evaluate	these	discussions	in	detail.	We	should	note	however,	that	the	most	pertinent	reproach	of	
the	idea	of	‘relative	autonomy’	was	developed	by	Laclau	and	Mouffe.	They	showed	that	the	idea	of	
relative	autonomy	could	not	be	squared	with	Althusser’s	simultaneous	desire	to	retain	the	notion	of	
the	overarching	‘determination	of	the	economy	in	the	last	instance’	(Laclau	and	Mouffe	1985,	viii).	
Laclau	and	Mouffe	were	I	think	correct	to	emphasize	the	incongruity	between	these	two	contrasting	
objectives	in	Althusser’s	theory.	Nevertheless,	the	preliminary	move	in	Althusser’s	argument,	i.e.	to	
establish	the	relative	autonomy	of	 the	superstructures	 from	the	economic	base,	 seems	also	highly	
pertinent	 and	 analogous	 to	 our	 discussion	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 ontology	 and	 politics.	
Moreover,	Laclau	and	Mouffe’s	criticism	of	‘relative	autonomy’	does	not	apply	here,	since	my	aim	is	
not	to	attribute	ontology	with	a	determinate	status	in	the	first,	last,	or	any	other	instance.	Instead,	
my	suggestion	is	that	we	need	to	appreciate	that	politics	is	something	distinct	from	ontology	with	its	
own	 discrete	 characteristics,	 that	 ontology	 plays	 a	 conditioning	 and	 constraining	 role	 in	 how	 we																																																									
14	My	 emphasis	 on	 ‘relative	 autonomy’	 is	 inspired	 by	 Pierre	 Bourdieu,	 who	 invokes	 this	 phrase	 in	 his	
consideration	of	the	relationship	between	Heidegger’s	philosophy	and	his	association	with	Nazism	(Bourdieu,	
1991).	However,	Bourdieu	stressed	the	relative	autonomy	of	philosophical	thought	from	the	context	in	which	
it	was	articulated,	and	vice-versa,	whereas	my	emphasis	 is	 instead	on	the	relative	autonomy	of	the	realm	of	
‘the	political’	(understood	as	a	theatre	of	domination,	resistance	and	freedom)	from	the	conditioning	effects	of	
philosophical	thought.			
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perceive	 and	 interpret	 political	 events	 and	 experiences,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 a	 relationship	 of	
determination.i	In	 fact,	 to	 the	 contrary,	 politics	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	 ontology	 and	 there	 is	 no	
straightforward	relationship	between	one’s	political	views	and	commitments	and	one’s	ontological	
assumptions	about	how	the	world	is.	My	sense	is	that	the	term	‘relative	autonomy’	neatly	captures	
what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 this	 complex	 interrelationship,	 where	 this	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	 strong	 mutual	
imbrication	between	ontology	 and	politics,	 but	where	 this	 is	 not	 a	 relationship	of	 straightforward	
necessity	and	where	these	different	registers	are	not	simply	reducible	to	each	other.15		
As	evidence	for	this	relative	autonomy	of	politics	from	ontology,	we	can	highlight	how	it	 is	
possible	to	get	different	kinds	of	political	analyses	from	those	who	share	a	basic	set	of	ontological	
assumptions.	In	this	respect,	we	might	note	the	traditions	of	both	left	and	right	Hegelianism,	or	that	
Heidegger’s	 association	 with	 Nazism	 did	 not	 stop	many	 French	 leftists	 intellectuals	 appropriating	
core	 elements	 of	 his	 thought,	 or,	 as	 the	 saying	 goes,	 that	 there	 are	 as	 many	 different	 forms	 of	
Marxism	and	there	are	Marxists.	More	recently,	we	could	cite	the	heated	exchanges	between	Laclau	
and	Žižek,	who	share	a	 common	commitment	 to	Lacanian	psychoanalysis	but	who	have	disagreed	
strongly	 about	 their	 respective	 political	 viewpoints	 (Laclau,	 2006;	 Žižek,	 2006).	 Laclau	 stressed	 a	
Gramscian	inspired	politics,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	role	of	the	new	social	movements	and	the	need	
to	build	a	collective	hegemony,	whereas	Žižek	has	sought	to	retain	a	conventional	Marxist	account	of	
the	priority	of	class	struggle,	and	to	revive	a	Leninist	story	about	the	need	to	seize	political	power	
(Laclau,	 1996,	 43;	 Žižek,	 1999,	 236;	 2002).	 Similarly,	we	might	 note	 the	way	 in	which	Mouffe	 has	
invoked	 Schmitt’s	 conception	 of	 ‘the	 political’	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 broadly	 left/pluralist	 form	 of	
politics,	 which	 is	 clearly	 distinct	 from	 Schmitt’s	 own	 brand	 of	 neo-conservatism.	 These	 examples	
demonstrate	how	it	is	possible	to	derive	different	political	analyses	and	commitments	from	a	given	
ontological	 horizon,	 and	 by	 way	 of	 conclusion	 I	 stress	 that	 it	 must	 also	 be	 possible	 to	 establish	
common	political	alliances	and	agendas	between	those	who	disagree	about	questions	of	ontology.	
	
Conclusion	
	
Clearly	 one	 does	 not	 fully	 choose	 one’s	 ontological	 horizon.	 Nevertheless,	 I	 think	 we	 do	
retain	greater	choice	with	respect	to	our	political	opinions	and	priorities,	and,	in	my	view,	the	future	
direction	 of	 poststructuralism	would	 be	 best	 served	 by	 an	 explicit	 shift	 towards	 a	more	 concrete	
focus	on	 forms	of	power	and	domination,	as	well	as	an	analysis	of	 the	conditions	of	 freedom	and	
emancipation.	I	recognise	that	these	points	of	emphasis	reflect	a	particular	set	of	assumptions	about	
the	nature	of	‘the	political’,	and	these	suppositions	are	contestable.	However,	my	contention	is	that	
this	emphasis	on	politics	as	power	and	domination	remains	crucially	important	in	the	context	of	neo-
liberalism.	Indeed,	this	is	an	area	where,	I	think,	the	insights	of	poststructuralism	-	with	its	stress	on	
contingency,	relationality,	and	temporal	dislocation	-	can	be	particularly	fruitful.	This	is	because	the	
forms	of	power	 that	we	 face	 today	are	 increasingly	 complex	and	cannot	be	properly	explained	by	
approaches	 that	 reduce	domination	 to	single	explanation	 (e.g.	Marxism),	nor	by	 those	who	take	a	
methodically	 individualist	approach	(e.g.	the	neo-republican	account	of	domination	put	forward	by	
Philip	Pettit).	By	way	of	contrast,	if	those	associated	with	poststructuralism	(broadly	defined)	could	
begin	to	talk	a	little	less	about	questions	of	ontology,	and	build	instead	common	political	objectives	
and	 frameworks	 of	 analysis	 across	 different	 ontological	 traditions,	 then	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	
operations	of	power	in	the	current	system	of	global	capitalism	might	well	be	significantly	advanced.	
Moreover,	there	is	a	degree	of	urgency	here,	because	the	current	preoccupation	with	ontology	(at	
the	expense	of	a	more	concrete	analysis	of	power	and	domination)	 is,	 in	 the	end,	 to	give	 into	 the	
philosopher’s	 impulse,	 i.e.	 to	merely	 interpret	 the	world,	 when	 the	 point	 is	 to	 change	 it	 through	
political	critique	and	activism.	
																																																									
15	Here	my	thoughts	resonate	with	Bruno	Bosteels,	who	is	similarly	critical	of	the	preoccupation	with	ontology	
characteristic	of	a	great	deal	of	contemporary	continental	thought,	and	who	likewise	maintains	that	‘there	can	
be	no	determinate	politics…that	would	simply	derive	from	ontology’	(Bosteels,	2011,	43).	
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